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Williams: Constitutional Law - When States Break Promises: Defining Propert

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-When States Break Promises: Defining Property Interests in the Procedural Due Process Context,
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005).
INTRODUCTION

As part of her divorce proceedings, Jessica Gonzales sought and obtained a protection order (PO) against her husband, Simon Gonzales, in a
Colorado state court on May 21, 1999.' The PO enjoined the husband from
disturbing Gonzales or their mutual children and required him to stay at least
100 yards from Gonzales's home.2 On the reverse side, the PO contained a
warning that violation of the order was a crime that could result in arrest and
a notice to law enforcement officials instructing them to "use every reasonable means to enforce this restraining order."3 The PO also told police that
they "shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impracticable under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of the restrained person when [the officer has] information amounting to probable cause" of a violation of the order.4 The state court made the PO permanent on June 4, 1999, and modified
it to give the husband some visitation time with his daughters.5
Between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. on June 22, 1999, the husband took the
three daughters, who were playing outside Gonzales's house, in contravention of the PO.6 Approximately two hours later, Gonzales called the Castle
Rock Police Department, which sent two officers.7 She showed them the PO
1. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2800 (2005).
2.
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2800-01. The couple had three daughters, Rebecca, Katherine, and Leslie. Id. The children were ten, nine, and seven years old.
Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
("Gonzales I').
3.
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2801.
4.
Id. The PO stated that an officer:
shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of the restrained person when
[the officer has] information amounting to probable cause that the
restrained person has been properly served with a copy of this order or has received actual notice of the existence of this order.
Gonzales II, 366 F.3d at 1103-04 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
5.
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2801. The husband was able to take the children
on alternate weekends, two weeks during the summer, and for a mid-week dinner as
arranged by the parties. Id. He was allowed to go to the house to collect and drop
off the children during the exchanges. Id.
6.
Id. This was a Tuesday, but no arrangements for the allowed mid-week dinner visit had been made. Id.
7.
Id.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
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and requested its enforcement, but the officers told her that there was nothing they could do and she should call again if the children were not returned
by 10:00 p.m. 8 Gonzales called the Police Department three more times that

evening: 1) at 8:30 p.m. after receiving a phone call from the children's father during which he told Gonzales where he was with the children; 2) at
10:10 p.m.; 3) and again at 12:10 a.m.9 At the 8:30 p.m. call, the police told
her to call if the children were not back by 10:00 p.m."0 At the 10:10 p.m.
call, the police told her to call again if the children were not back by 12:00
a.m." At the 12:10 a.m. call, the police told her to wait for an officer to arrive.1 2 By 12:50 a.m., no officer had arrived, so Gonzales went to the police
station. 3 When she arrived, an officer took her statement and went to dinner.'4 At approximately 3:20 a.m., the husband arrived at the police station
and began shooting a handgun at the building. 5 The police shot and killed
him, then found his daughters dead in the cab of his truck; their father had
killed them earlier in the night. 6
Jessica Gonzales subsequently filed an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
the town of Castle Rock, alleging that the Castle Rock Police Department
violated her due process rights by having a policy of refusing to enforce
POs. 7 She alleged that as applied to her this practice was either willful or
with "deliberate indifference" to her civil rights. 8 The district court was
unsure whether the suit was based on substantive or procedural grounds
from the complaint, but granted a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
complaint failed under either theory. 9 A divided panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the ruling with respect to the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id. at 2801-02.
Id.
Id. at 2802.
Id.
Id. at 2802.
Id.
Id.
Id.

17.

Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002)

("Gonzales r').
18.
Id.; Gonzales II, 366 F.3d at 1127. The federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
creates a cause of action for any act by or on behalf of a state which deprives a person of his or her constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001). See generally Jack
M. Beermann, A Critical Approach To Section 1983 With Special Attention To
Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 51 (1989) (discussing § 1983 actions).
19.
Gonzales II, 366 F.3d at 1126 (McConnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The panel of the Tenth Circuit concluded that Gonzales and her children did not allege a "special relationship" with the police and concluded the police
did not create the danger, which would possibly have created an affirmative duty to
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/15
protect them from that danger. Gonzales I, 307 F.3d at 1262-63.
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substantive issue, but reversed with respect to the procedural - a result
which was repeated on an en banc rehearing." The Tenth Circuit held Jessica Gonzales had a protected property interest in the enforcement of the PO,
and the town had deprived her of that property interest by not seriously considering its enforcement. 2' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 2 In a 7-2 decision, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision and
held that Colorado law did not create a property interest in the enforcement
of a PO, and thus no property interest could have been deprived by the police department's failure to act.23
Castle Rock presents the application of procedural due process jurisprudence to the unique area of domestic violence mandatory arrest laws.
The history of this area lends a new dimension to procedural due process
analysis because the legislative purpose of enacting these laws contrasts with
traditional law enforcement discretion. This case note will review the history of mandatory arrest in domestic violence cases with a focus on Colorado's domestic violence statutes in particular. It will show that these laws
were created to protect victims at the scene and to alter cultural attitudes of
the public and police by eliminating a traditional discretion the police have
enjoyed. The note will review a selection of United States Supreme Court
decisions defining "property interests" protected by the procedural due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, specifically focusing on how state law creates these property interests. The note
will review how the Supreme Court has applied due process to active government services, such as the government's obligation to provide certain
kinds of medical care. The note will explore the Castle Rock opinion and
demonstrate that in holding the traditional discretion of statutory law enforcement instructions applied, the majority failed to consider the domestic
violence context of Colorado's mandatory enforcement laws. By disregarding these laws, the Court ignored the Colorado Legislature's policy choices.
Finally, this note will explore some of the implications of the Castle Rock
ruling, particularly in the area of domestic violence victim advocacy.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Gonzales 11, 366 F.3d at 1096.
Id. at 1117.
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 543 U.S. 955 (2004) (granting certiorari).
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2800, 2810. Justice Scalia wrote the majority
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, and Breyer. Id. at 2800. Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion, joined
by Justice Breyer. Id. at 2811. Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justice GinsPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming
Scholarship, 2006
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BACKGROUND
MandatoryEnforcementfor Domestic Violence

Domestic violence has a long history of being socially accepted in
society.24 Resistance to the subordinate status of women in the United States
began to grow after the Civil War." Studies appeared in the late 1960s and
early 1970s showing that in general, police responses to domestic violence

were "perfunctory. 2 6 Research even pointed to police ineffectiveness in
domestic violence as a cause for excessive homicide rates.27 The push for a
change in police policies was initially a political strategy and a "corrective to
a social system that refused to treat male intimate violence as offensive conduct and as criminal behavior."2 Policy makers saw mandatory arrest statutes as a way to change traditional ideas and send a message to abusers and
communities that domestic violence was a crime and would be treated as
such.29 In 1977, Oregon became the first state to pass a law requiring law
enforcement officers to make arrests in domestic violence cases with probable cause.3 ° More states adopted this approach and by 1983, six states had
mandatory arrest laws.3' This trend intensified with the 1984 release by the
United States National Institute of Justice's (NIJ) Minneapolis Experiment.3 2
The Minneapolis Experiment provided strong evidence that arresting domes24.
Vito Nicholas Ciraco, Note, Fighting Domestic Violence with Mandatory
Arrest, Are We Winning?: An Analysis in New Jersey, 22 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
169, 172 (2001).
25.
Id. at 172-73.
26.
Id. at 173. (quoting EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 37-38 (2d ed. 1996)).

27.
Id. at 173-74.
28.
G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence,
and The Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 HouS. L. REV.
237, 266, 265 (2005).
29.
Prentice L. White, Stopping the Chronic Batterer Through Legislation: Will
It Work This Time?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 709, 752 (2004) ("The policy behind mandatory arrests was to defeat the notion that government should not interfere in family
affairs and dictate to the husband how to rear his children or maintain control of his
family.").
30.
Machaela M. Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Violence As a Crime Against The
State: The Need For Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CAL. L. REv. 643, 653
(1997) (naming Oregon as the first state to require arrests in domestic violence
cases); Jessica Dayton, Essay, The Silencing of a Woman's Choice: Mandatory Arrest and No Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, 9 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 281, 283 (2003) (referring to Oregon as the first state to pass a domestic violence mandatory arrest statute).
31.
Hoctor, supra note 30, at 653. In addition to the mandatory arrest laws, twothirds of the states had made the arrest process easier by allowing warrantless arrests
in misdemeanor domestic violence cases. Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/15
32.
Id. at 655.
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tic violence offenders greatly reduced recidivism over a six-month period.3 3
As a result of this study and the United States Attorney General's recommendations, mandatory arrest quickly became the standard law enforcement
response in domestic violence cases.34
Subsequent data and commentary called into question the wisdom of
mandatory arrest policies. Results from subsequent studies attempting to
replicate the results of the Minneapolis Experiment were ambiguous.35
While these studies may have been flawed in their methods, the results still
cast some doubt on the efficacy of mandatory arrest as a specific deterrence.36 Other criticisms of mandatory arrest policies have surfaced as well.
Some women's advocates and feminists argue that mandatory arrest policies
and statutes may actually increase the chance of further violence, are disempowering to victims, and serve to reinforce patriarchal state involvement.37
With full access to this information about the benefits and drawbacks, many
states today have settled on mandatory arrest in domestic violence cases as
part of the strategy of reducing this crime.38
33.

Id. at 655-56. The study randomly assigned one of three police responses to

314 calls to police. Id. at 655. The police either arrested the suspect based on probable cause, counseled the suspect, or separated the suspect from the victim with a
warning that future contact would result in an arrest. Id. Arrest records showed that
in the following six-month period, the arrest procedure resulted in the lowest recidivism (13%), separation resulted in the highest (26%), and counseling was insignificant compared to either. Id. Victim reports over the same period showed that counseling resulted in the highest recidivism (37%) and arrest the lowest (19%), with
removal close to counseling (33%). Id. at 656.
34.
See lid. Mandatory enforcement in domestic violence cases was not always
required by statute; many police departments adopted the procedure as a policy. Id.
35.
Hoctor, supra note 30, at 657-58.
36.
Id.
37.
See Dayton, supra note 30, at 285-86 (arguing that mandatory arrest serves to
dis-empower abused women); Miccio, supra note 28, at 280-281 (pointing out that
pro-arrest policies may cause abusers to move on to new victims rather than stop
abusing); Erin L. Han, Note, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 175-79
(2003) (arguing that mandatory arrest is the expression of a state opinion that victims are helpless and thus the state must take control).
38.
Brief of National Coalition Against Domestic Violence and National Center
for Victims of Crime as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 20, Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (No. 04-278). Twenty-four states
require arrest for violation of a protection order: Alaska, California, Colorado, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at 20
n.7. Seventeen states and the District of Columbia require arrest for domestic violence regardless of the presence of a protection order: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
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Colorado'sDomestic Violence MandatoryEnforcement Scheme
In Colorado, legislators approached domestic violence victim's advocates concerning mandatory arrest provisions. a9 Advocates welcomed the
legislators' approach because the advocates had been working to persuade
police departments to implement pro-arrest policies.'0 Colorado passed the
modem form of its protection order and domestic violence scheme in 1994.41
In passing the sweeping bill, the Legislature specifically "[found], determine[d], and declare[d] that this act [was] necessary for the immediate pres'
ervation of the public peace, health, and safety."42
The first important applicable change made by the Act of June 3,
1994 (1994 Act) was the Legislature's addition of the mandatory arrest provision for the crime of violating a protection order.43 Before the 1994 revision, section 18-6-803.5(3) established violation of a protection order as a
misdemeanor and required that the sentence for a violation be served consecutively with the crime giving rise to the protection order. 4 The 1994 Act
Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
39. Miccio, supranote 28, at 279.
40. Id.
41. See Brief of Peggy Kems, Former Member of the House of Representatives
of the State of Colorado, and Texas Domestic Violence Direct Service Providers, as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125
S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (No. 04-278) ("In 1994, the Colorado General Assembly tackled
the problem of domestic violence through legislative reform.") (citation omitted);
see Act of June 3, 1994, 1994 Colo. Sess. Laws. H.B. 94-1253 (legislating several
statutory provisions to reduce the incidence of domestic violence) [hereinafter "1994
Act"]. These provisions were codified in part at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6800.3 et seq. (West 1995), COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102 et seq. (West 1995),
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-11-101 (West 1995), and COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §

16-3-105 et seq. (West 1995).
42. 1994 Act § 28.
43. Id. § 4. The 1994 Act language refers to "restraining order[s]," however the
term was changed to "protection order" in 2003 legislation. Act of Apr. 17, 2003,
2003 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 139 (West). As the term "protection order" is the current generally accepted language, it will be used throughout this Note.
44.

COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3) (West 1993). The subsection for-

merly read:
Violation of a restraining order is a class 1 misdemeanor when the
court order violated has been issued pursuant to section 18-11001. Any sentence imposed pursuant to this subsection (3) shall
run consecutively and not concurrently with any sentence imposed
for any crime which gave rise to the issuing of the restraining order.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/15
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replaced this language with a far more expansive provision requiring police
to arrest or seek a warrant for arrest with probable cause of a violation.4 5
The 1994 Act also altered the definition of "domestic violence."
Prior to this change, Colorado law gave a fairly simple definition of domestic violence as the actual or threatened physical abuse or destruction of property as a method of control of an intimate partner.4 6 The 1994 legislation
created a way for any crime to be classified as "domestic violence" by stating that domestic violence included any crime against a person when that
crime is used to coerce, punish, control, intimidate, or get revenge on an
intimate partner, or former partner.47 The idea of applying the element of

Id. The Colorado statute referred to in the above excerpt provided for a mandatory
restraining order prohibiting all criminal defendants from "harassing, molesting,
intimidating, retaliating against, or tampering with any witness to or victim of the
acts charged." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-1001 (West 1993). Thus "restraining
orders" in Colorado prior to the 1994 Act did not resemble those at issue today. The
modem Colorado protection order was created by this same legislation. Id. § 14-4101 etseq.
45.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3) (West 1994). The statute states in

relevant part that
(a) Whenever a restraining order is issued, the protected person
shall be provided with a copy of such order. A peace officer shall
use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order.
(b) A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person when the peace officer has information amounting
to probable cause that:
(I) The restrained person has violated or attempted to violate
any provision of a restraining order; and
(II) The restrained person has been properly served with a
copy of the restraining order or the restrained person has received actual notice of the existence and substance of such
order.
Id.

46. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-800.3(1) (West 1993). Subsection (1) reads
that "'[d]omestic violence' means the infliction or threat of infliction of any bodily
injury or harmful physical contact or the destruction of property or threat thereof as
a method of coercion, control, revenge, or punishment upon a person with whom the
actor is involved in an intimate relationship." Id.
47.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-800.3(1) (West 1994). In relevant part, the
Published
by Law
Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
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domestic violence to other crimes is reinforced under several other provisions of the 1994 Act, one of which elevated the severity of "a crime [for
which] the underlying factual basis ... included an act of domestic violence
. In connection with this change, the 1994 Act added section 18-6803.6, which required an arrest "without undue delay" in cases where there
is "probable cause to believe that a crime or offense involving domestic violence... has been committed."4 9
The mandatory nature of the 1994 Act's arrest provision has never
been questioned. Commentators have accepted the arrest provision as mandatory as a matter of coursei 0 This universal acknowledgement shows there
was no concern whether the statute required arrest. In an unpublished case,
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit accepted without comment that
Colorado's arrest statute required arrest where the police found probable

Domestic violence also includes any other crime against a person
or felony crime against property or any municipal ordinance violation against a person, but not against property, when used as a
method of coercion, control, punishment, intimidation, or revenge
directed against a person with whom the actor is or has been involved in an intimate relationship.
Id.

48. Id. § 16-21-102. This section defined "offender" as one guilty of a class one
misdemeanor or an offense involving domestic violence, even if the criminal act
itself did not rise to the level of a class one misdemeanor. Id.
49. Id. § 18-6-803.6(1). In full, the statute requires that
[w]hen a peace officer determines that there is probable cause to
believe that a crime or offense involving domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3(1), has been committed, the officer
shall, without undue delay, arrest the person suspected of its
commission and charge the person with the appropriate crime or
offense.
Id. The new § 18-6-803.6 gave the police guidelines on criteria for arrest. Id.
50. See Margaret Martin Barry, Protective Order Enforcement. Another Pirouette, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 339, 343 n. 18 (1995) (including Colorado as one of
forty-three states mandating arrest); Timothy Johnson, Domestic Violence and Federal FirearmsLaws, 33 COLO. LAW. 61, 63 (2004) ("[V]iolation of any of the provisions [of § 18-6-300.5] requires an arrest."); Melody K. Fuller and Janet L. Stansbury, 1994 LegislatureStrengthens Domestic Violence Protection Orders,23 COLO.
LAW. 2327, 2327 (finding that the new § 18-6-300.5 "mandates law enforcement
officers to arrest and charge people suspected of committing domestic violence");
Miccio, supra note 28, at 239 n.2 (including Colorado in a list of states mandating
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/15
arrest for probable cause violation of a protection order).
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cause.' Thus the common understanding was clear that these statutes required police action.
Definition of PropertyInterest
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution requires, in relevant part, that no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."52
An analysis of a claim for an undue deprivation of due process rights
begins with the question of whether the plaintiff has a protected interest in
life, liberty, or property.5 3 The modem era of defining protected property
interests began with the 1972 case Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth.54 Prior to Roth, the United States Supreme Court held that "[t]he extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced 5by
the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous
5
loss.'

Roth was, and remains, the landmark case in defining property rights
with respect to due process issues. David Roth was a professor at Wisconsin
State University originally hired to teach for one year. 56 His notice of appointment referred to Wisconsin state law, which provided that professors
only gained tenure rights after four years of employment.57 Nevertheless,
when Roth's one-year appointment ended and the university did not retain
51.
Eckert v. Town of Silverthome, 25 F. App'x 679, 686 (10th Cir. 2001). Appellant sued the Town of Silverthome, Colorado for failing to enforce a protection
order by not arresting the man she lived with. Id. at 683. She appealed summary
judgment in favor of the defendants under equal protection and substantive due
process theories. Id. The panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed because the officers
did not have probable cause to arrest the man. Id. at 686. The court stated that the
"mandatory arrest provisions [§§ 18-6-803.5(3)(b) and -800.3(1)] require as a prerequisite that an officer establish probable cause." Id. While it has no precedential
value, the case is notable because the court accepted the statutes' mandatory nature
without question. Id.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
53.

American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999).

54.
55.

Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist

Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)). In Goldberg, recipients of

New York's Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) faced termination of
their benefits without any kind of hearing. Id. at 255-56. The AFDC recipients sued
and the Court held that such benefits constituted an entitlement for qualified individuals and the plaintiffs were entitled to a hearing before being deprived of their

benefits. Id. at 271 (affirming the district court's judgment for the plaintiffs).
Roth,
408 U.S.
at 566. Scholarship, 2006
Published56.
by Law
Archive
of Wyoming
57. Id. at 566 nn.l, 2.
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him, he sued the university, alleging that the decision violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights.5" The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held that Roth's interest in his employment outweighed
the university's interest in dismissing him without any proceedings.59 The
United States Supreme Court considered the question of "whether the respondent had a constitutional right to a statement of reasons and a hearing on
the University's decision not to rehire him for another year."' The Court
decided that the proper analysis was to look at "the nature of the interest at
stake."' The Court noted that while due process protections "extend[ed]
well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money," the protections had "certain boundaries."6' 2 In order to have a valid claim, the person
alleging a deprivation of property must have "already acquired.., specific
benefits." 3 The Court stated that a person's interest in a benefit must be
"more than an abstract need or desire" or "unilateral expectation of it."
The person "must... instead. . . have a legitimate claim of entitlement to
it."6' The Court held that protected property interests "stem from a[] [constitutionally] independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement ..... 6 In applying these rules, the Court held that because the university only appointed
him for one year with no provision for renewal, Roth had no legitimate entitlement to re-employment and, therefore, no property interest requiring a
hearing's protection.67
The Court repeated this construction of protected rights in subsequent cases, such as Wolff v. McDonnell and Goss v. Lopez." In Wolff, a
prisoner in a Nebraska prison filed a complaint alleging that disciplinary
procedures revoking good-time credits without adequate process violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9 The Court acknowledged that the Federal Consti-

58.
59.
60.

Id. at 566, 568.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 569.

61.

Id. at 571.

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 572.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 577.
Id.

66.

Id.

67. Id. at 578 ("[The university] did not provide for contract renewal absent 'sufficient cause.' Indeed, they made no provision for renewal whatsoever.").
68.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975).

69.

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 543. Good-time credits were given to prisoners at the

discretion of the prison administrators and reduced a prisoner's incarceration time.
Id. at 546 n.6. The deprivation of the credits had the effect of lengthening the prishttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/15
oner's term relative to the term with the credits. Id.
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tution did not require good-time credits.7" Nevertheless, once such credits
were given, the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to their
deprivation and required the State to institute appropriate procedural safeguards.7'
In Goss, several suspended students sued the school district, alleging
that the schools' procedures for appeal of suspensions were inadequate.72
The school argued that because the state had no constitutional duty to provide education, the deprivation of that education could not be a deprivation
of procedural due process.73 The Court rejected this argument, holding that
because the State created a statutory right to education, that right could not
be deprived without appropriate procedural safeguards.74 The school argued
in the alternative that even if there was a protected interest, the deprivation
was too small to require due process.7 This argument was reminiscent of
pre-Roth case law and did not persuade the Court.76 The Court held that
while the magnitude of the deprivation may play a part in the decision about
the nature of the required due process, it was immaterial to the question of
whether a protected interest was involved.77 The Court ultimately held that
deprivation of education was subject to protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment and specifically noted that part of the Amendment's purpose
was to protect against arbitrary deprivation.7"
The Court qualified its language defining property interests in Memphis Gas, Light and Water Division v. Craft."" In this case, several public
utility customers sued the utility company requesting, in part, declaratory

70.

Id. at 557.

71.

Id.

72. Goss, 419 U.S. at 567. The then-existing regulations allowed a principal to
suspend students for up to ten days or expel the student. Id. The principal was required to notify the student's parents within twenty-four hours, and the student or
parents could appeal the decision to the school board at the next meeting. Id. The
plaintiffs in the case requested some kind of process before or within a reasonable
time following a suspension or expulsion. Id.
73. Id. at 572.
74. Id. at 574.
75.

Id. at 575.

76. Id. at 576. The pre-Roth trend did consider the magnitude of the deprivation,
but this is no longer relevant to defining property in the modem line of cases. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63.
77. Goss, 419 U.S. at 575-76. The Court said that "its view has been that as long
as a property deprivation is not de minimis, [the deprivation's] gravity is irrelevant
to the question whether account must be taken of the Due Process Clause." Id. at
576. The Court excluded de minimis property deprivation from protection. Id.
78. Id. at 576, 574. The Court went on to hold that the existing procedure was
inadequate and set out guidelines for new procedures. Id. at 581.
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and injunctive relief 8 The principal plaintiffs had duplicate utility meters
and despite efforts to correct the situation both by communicating with the
utility company and by hiring individuals to combine the meters, they were
consistently double-billed.3 In time, the company discontinued utility service for nonpayment. 2 The United States District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee, Western Division, ruled that the utility service was not
property, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed.83 The Supreme Court, in considering the question of whether the
service was property under the Fourteenth Amendment, reiterated the rule
that existing state law defined constitutionally protected property rights."
The Court went a step further, however, and stated that "federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a 'legitimate
claim of entitlement' protected by the Due Process Clause."85 A review of
Tennessee law revealed that utility companies did have the power to terminate customers' service, but not in cases of bona fide bill disputes. 6 The
plaintiffs argued this meant that utility service could only be terminated for
cause, creating a property interest in continued service. 7 If there was a
property interest in continued service, the utility company would be required
to give some kind of process before it was cancelled. 8 The Court held that
Tennessee law recognized the property interest in public utility service by
providing that termination of service may only be performed for a good reason. 9 It went on to affirm the Sixth Circuit's holding that the utility company's procedures were inadequate to provide due process with respect to
bill disputes. 9
InLogan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, the Court again explored
the "for cause" rationale for defining a benefit as property.9 Zimmerman
Brush Company discharged Logan after a one-month probationary period
because his disability prevented him from meeting the physical requirements

80.
81.
82.
83.
1976).

Id. at3.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div., 534 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir.
The panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disposed of the issue

by perfunctorily noting that eight federal district court and court of appeals opinions

held utility service as property. Id.
84. Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 9.
85. Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)).

86.

Id.

87.

Id. at 11-12.

88.

Id. at9.

89. Id.at 11.
90.
Id. at 15.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/15
91. Logan v.Zinnerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
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of the job.9 2 He filed a complaint with the Illinois Fair Employment Commission. 3 The Commission was required by statute to provide a hearing
within 120 days.94 This time period passed before the hearing and Zimmerman moved for dismissal, arguing that the Commission no longer had jurisdiction.9' The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with Logan's argument that
depriving him of this hearing opportunity was a violation of his due process
rights.96 The United States Supreme Court emphasized the mandatory language of the statute providing for a hearing. 97 The Court held "the state
scheme [had] deprived Logan of a property right." ' In its procedural due
process case law, the Court has carefully considered whether the asserted
property interest is mandated or simply discretionary according to state law.
Nature of State Protection
Because Castle Rock involves an allegation that the police failed to
protect named parties in a protection order, it is important to explore the
extent of the Government's obligation to provide services. In the 1977 case
Mahers v. Roe, the Court discussed whether, as a general matter, a state is
obligated to provide services which it may not constitutionally deny.99 The
case involved the Connecticut Medicaid system's self-imposed obligation to
pay for birth expenses of indigent women." The Connecticut regulations
only allowed Medicaid payment for abortions which were medically necessary. l'' The plaintiffs were indigent women who were unable to secure certificates of medical necessity from physicians and were therefore denied
funding for abortion services.0 2 Among other arguments, the plaintiffs
claimed a denial of their due process rights.0 3 The Court acknowledged that
while a State has no obligation to provide medical care to indigent citizens,
once it undertakes to do so, its actions are subject to constitutional limitations. ° Under an Equal Protection analysis, the Court held that while the
state rules may have encouraged one decision about pregnancy over another,
it did not actually interfere with a constitutionally protected right.0 5 The
Court concluded the Constitution did not oblige Connecticut to pay for non92.

Id. at 426.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 433.
Mahers v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
Id. at 466-67.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 467.

103.

Id.

Id.Archive
at 469-70.
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therapeutic abortions, even while funding therapeutic abortions."° A state
may not block an individual's constitutional right, but it is not obligated to
spend resources to provide that right.
The Court applied this principle to state protection against private
actors in Martinez v. California. 7 State officials paroled a convicted rapist
after five years despite a sentence of one to twenty years with a recommendation that he serve the maximum.'" The man subsequently tortured, raped,
and killed a fifteen-year-old girl, whose family then sued the State." 9 The
plaintiffs had several theories, most notably that by releasing her murderer,
the state deprived the victim of her life without due process of law." 0 The
Court disagreed."' The Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment
provided protection from State action, and the murder in this case was the
result of a private actor."' The Court pointed out that the parole board had
no awareness of the particular danger to the victim, as opposed to the public
at large." 3 The implication is that releasing a person who may have some4
dangerous propensities to the population as a whole may be acceptable."
However, liability may be created if the parole board knows that the convicted person poses a danger to a particular person."'
The Court furthered this concept in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, a case with as tragic a factual background as
Castle Rock." 6 Joshua DeShaney was a child in the custody of his father,
Randy." 7 Randy physically abused Joshua over a significant period of
time.'
The Winnebago County Department of Social Services (DSS) became involved, removed Joshua from the home, and convened a Child Protection Team (CPT)." 9 The CPT met and decided that there was insufficient
evidence to keep Joshua away from the home and returned him to Randy
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at481.
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
Id. at 279.
Id. at 279-80.
Id. at 283.
Id. at285.

112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
See id.

115.

See id. The Court implied that the case may be different if a parole board is

aware of danger to a particular person. Id. "[T]he parole board was not aware that
appellants' decedent, as distinguished from the public at large, faced any special
danger." Id.
116. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189

(1989).
117. Id. at 191.
118. Id. at 192-93.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/15

119.

Id. at 192.
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with several protective requirements.'2 ° From January 1983 to March 1984,
DSS documented that Randy was not complying with the recommendations
of the CPT, that Joshua repeatedly exhibited injuries on caseworker home
visits, and an emergency room visit occurred at which time the hospital reported suspected abuse of Joshua by Randy.' 2' DSS did not act until March
of 1984, when Randy beat Joshua so severely he sustained permanent brain
injury. ' 22 Joshua's mother sued DSS under her name and his, arguing that
DSS deprived Joshua of his liberty without due process of law by failing to
adequately protect him against a known danger.' 23 The Court, consistent
with its decision in Martinez v. California,held the Fourteenth Amendment
does not "require[] the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors."' 24 The purpose of the Amendment "was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State
protected them from each other."' 25 The Court broadly held "a State's failure
to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a
violation of the Due Process Clause."' 2
Joshua's mother also argued that DSS's initial actions to protect him
created a special relationship obligating DSS to provide reasonable protection. 2' The Court disagreed. 2' While acknowledging certain affirmative
obligations for care were placed on the State in cases of involuntarily restricted persons such as prisoners, those obligations rise from the fact that
the State has restricted the ability of the individual to care for himself, not
from mere awareness of hardship. 29 The Court held that the State neither
created nor exacerbated Joshua's danger and therefore was not liable for his
13
injury.

0

In summary, the United States Supreme Court stressed that property
interests were created by obligations independent of the Federal Constitution. These interests arose from the entitlements granted in some state services such as employment or benefits. At the same time, states had no obligation to protect individuals from non-state actors. The Court explicitly
excepted prisoners because states restricted their ability to fend for them120. Id.
121. Id. at 192-93.
122. Id. 193.
123. Id. In contrast to Castle Rock, which was appealed on procedural due process grounds, DeShaney was pursued on substantive due process grounds. Castle
Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2803 (2005); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
124. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
125. Id. at 196.
126. Id. at 197.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 198.
129. Id. at 200.
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selves, and implied that state creation or exacerbation of a danger may also
be excepted. Some circuits implemented these exceptions. Even though
commentators and courts routinely accepted Colorado's PO statutes as mandatory, the issue had never been squarely addressed, particularly in a procedural due process context.''
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the United States Supreme Court considered whether Colorado state law provided an entitlement to enforcement
of a PO which would require procedural due process to deny.' 32 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, began the analysis by restating the principle that "a benefit is not a protected entitlement if
government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion."' 33 The Court
also declined to defer to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit's analysis of state law."3 The Court stated that while state law did
determine whether the interest was created, federal constitutional law determined "whether that interest rises to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement .... ."' The majority acknowledged that there is a general presumption of deference to the courts of appeals regarding the state law within their
jurisdictions, but the Court refused to defer to the appellate court's view of
Colorado law.'36 The Court explained its refusal by noting that the en banc
opinion relied primarily on "language from the restraining order, the statutory text, and a state-legislative-hearing transcript" rather than "on a deep
well of state-specific expertise."' 37 It reasoned there was nothing specific to
Colorado law to which the Tenth Circuit's expertise would apply.'
The
Tenth Circuit had relied on the language of the PO instructions to officers,
legislative history, and a Colorado provision granting immunity to officers
making good-faith arrests. "a The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
commented that to hold no property interest existed "would render domestic
abuse restraining orders utterly valueless."' 40 The Supreme Court characterized the comment as "sheer hyperbole."''
The Court did not believe that
131.

See supra notes 38, 50-51 and accompanying text.

132.

Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2803 (2005).

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2803-04 (quoting Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1, 9 (1978)) (internal quotations omitted).
136. Id. at 2804.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1105-10 (10th Cir. 2004)
(en banc).
140. Id. at 1109.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/15
141. Castle Rock, 125 S.Ct. at 2805.
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"these provisions of
Colorado law truly made enforcement of restraining
14 2
orders mandatory.',
The Court then explored the "well established tradition of police
discretion [that] has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest statutes."'4 3 The Court noted that in a case relating to a statute requiring police
to disperse certain crowds, it had previously held that "common sense [dictated] that all police officers must use some discretion in deciding when and
where to enforce city ordinances."'" In this context, the Court required
stronger language from the Colorado Legislature to show a "true mandate."' 4 5 In response to the dissent by Justice Stevens, the Court stated that
even though mandatory arrest statutes may have more effect in the domestic
violence context, "it is unclear how the mandatory-arrest paradigm applies to
cases in which the offender is not present to be arrested."'" The Court also
noted that mandatory government actions may exist for a reason other than
to give Gonzales an entitlement, and that such actions may be a public benefit rather than private. 47 The Court explained that Gonzales was not stating
that the police should have performed any particular action, but instead
named a range of options by alleging that the police should have "'use[d]
every reasonable means, up to and including arrest, to enforce the order's
terms."" 4 The Court labeled such a requirement "vague" and inadequate to
support a property interest. 49 Finally, the Court reasoned that the mandatory
arrest statute did not connect the "'protected person"' with a right to enforcement.'
The Court acknowledged that the statute referred to the protected person in other contexts, such as distributing copies of the PO and,
notably, giving the protected person the right to initiate contempt proceed5

ings. 1

142. Id.
143. Id. at 2805-06.
144. Id. at 2806 (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 62 n.32 (1999)) (alteration in original).
145. Id. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-6-803.5(3)(a), (b) (West 2005) (requiring that a peace officer "shall use every reasonable means to enforce a protection order" and that "[a] peace officer shall arrest . . . or ... seek a warrant for the
arrest of a restrained person" with probable cause of a protection order violation).
146. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2807. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying
text.
147. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2807-08.
148. Id. at 2807 (quoting Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 29-30, Castle Rock
v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (No. 04-278)).
149. Id. at 2807, 2808.
150. Id. at 2808 (quoting CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-6-803.5(3)(a)).
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The Court then declared that even if an entitlement was created, it
need not necessarily be a property interest.'5 2 First, the enforcement of a PO
does not have a monetary value "as even [the Court's] Roth-type propertyas-entitlement cases have implicitly required."''
Second, the nature of the
alleged entitlement was "a function that government actors have always performed - to wit, arresting people who they have probable cause to believe
have committed a criminal offense."' 54 The Court reiterated its O'Bannon
decision, implying that Gonzales's benefit from the PO would constitute an
155
indirect benefit and, therefore, would not be a protected property interest.
Based on these arguments, the Court held that Gonzales had no protected
property interest in enforcement of her PO.156 In conclusion, the Court
specified that while the holdings in Castle Rock and DeShaney precluded a
suit for third-party enforcement under the Constitution, individual states are
free to craft such a remedy independently.'5 7
Justice Souter's Concurrence
Justice Souter's concurrence, with which Justice Breyer joined,
agreed with all the points of the majority opinion, but emphasized the role of
police discretion. 5 He argued the alleged entitlement interest was in conflict with traditional police discretion to either enforce or not enforce a protection order. 59 He noted a protected person does not have the power to
limit the police's discretion in choosing not to enforce and implied the same
person has no power to compel enforcement.'" Justice Souter also argued
that the actual property interest for which Gonzales had claimed protection
was in fact a procedural consideration.'' Since the procedural due process
protection applies to substantive rights, it may not be invoked to protect an
entitlement to procedure.' 62 A State does not "create a property right merely
by ordaining beneficial procedure unconnected to some articulable substan-

152. Id. at 2809.
153. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id. at2810.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2811 (Souter, J., concurring).
159. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
160. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter wrote that "no one would argue
that the beneficiary of a Colorado order like the one here would be authorized to
control a court's contempt power or order the police to refrain from arresting." Id.
161. Id. at 2812 (Souter, J., concurring).
162. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
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Justice Stevens's Dissent
In a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens first argued
that, without question, a private security contract creating the functional
equivalent of a PO would be considered "property."' 65 According to Justice
Stevens, there is no functional difference between an entitlement to contract
for security services and the state law which enabled Gonzales's PO, even
though such protection is not available to the ordinary citizen, only to those
who are protected persons under POs.'6
A major thrust of the dissent was the majority's refusal to defer to
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Colorado
law. 67 Justice Stevens commended the Tenth Circuit's examination of the
law with regard to police discretion and its contextual exploration of the
particular Colorado law in question. 6 He argued the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that Gonzales did hold an enforceable property right was reasonable
and "worthy of [the Court's] deference.'

69

He said the majority's reason for

dismissing the Tenth Circuit's analysis was that the court relied solely on
"the statute's text and legislative history and distinguished arguably relevant
Colorado case law."' 70 Justice Stevens noted that "it is precisely when there
is no state law on point that the presumption that circuits have local expertise
plays any useful role."''
In the alternative, Justice Stevens argued that the question of
whether Colorado created a property interest should have been certified to

163. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
164. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 2813 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2814 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2814-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 2815 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens criticized the majority,
stating that "[u]nfortunately, although the majority properly identifies the 'central
state-law question' in this case as 'whether Colorado law gave respondent a right to
police enforcement of the restraining order,' it has chosen to ignore our settled practice by providing its own answer to that question." Id. at 2814 (internal citation
omitted).
170. Id at 2815 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is precisely when there is no
state law on point that the presumption that circuits have local expertise plays any
useful role. When a circuit's resolution of a novel question of state law is grounded
on a concededly complete review of all the pertinent state-law materials, that decito deference.").
sion
entitled
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the Colorado Supreme Court.'72 He put forth several reasons for this position. First, federalist principles militated toward interpretation of a state's
statute by that same state's courts, particularly in cases with important policy
implications.'73 He also argued that doing so would relieve the Court from a
duty to adjudicate an unnecessary issue of constitutional law. 74 Finally, he
argued that because the Colorado Supreme Court was the final arbiter of
Colorado law, certification would serve judicial economy by resolving the
high court
issue immediately, as opposed to the possibility that Colorado's
17
could subsequently hear the same issue and decide it differently. 1
Justice Stevens then discussed several flaws in the majority analysis.
First, the majority improperly considered arrest statutes in general without
accounting for the unique circumstances of the domestic violence context. 76
In Justice Stevens's view, state statutes in the domestic violence field
uniquely eliminated police discretion.17 1 Importantly, Colorado's history
included joining the trend of mandatory arrest statutes nationwide to counter
7
traditional police practices of non-involvement in domestic violence. 1 Justice Stevens noted that the discretion the majority read into the Colorado
statute was probably appropriate in other circumstances, but that domestic
violence may be distinguished from those circumstances. 79 To reinforce
this claim, he said that other states with similar statutes have interpreted
them as eliminating police discretion and even allowed causes of action
similar to that at issue in the instant case. 80 Justice Stevens responded to the
majority's vagueness argument by showing that while the police may have
some situational discretion, the statute removes the choice to do nothing at
8
all.' '
Justice Stevens then addressed the second significant flaw in the majority opinion: the Court failed to account for the fact that the Colorado stat172. Id. at 2815 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even if the Court had good reason to
doubt the Court of Appeals' determination of state law, it would, in my judgment, be
a far wiser course to certify the question to the Colorado Supreme Court. Powerful
considerations support certification in this case." (footnote omitted)).
173. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 2815-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2816 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court gives short shrift to the unique case
of 'mandatory arrest' statutes in the domestic violence context; States passed a wave
of these statutes in the 1980's and 1990's with the unmistakable goal of eliminating
police discretion in this area.").
177. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2817-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2818 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2818-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2819-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra notes 148-49 and accomhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/15
panying text.
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ute was intended to create a narrow benefit for a narrow class of persons. 2
Justice Stevens argued that while other state laws may be broader, the Colorado Legislature plainly did not mean the statute at issue to provide a benefit
for the general Colorado population.8 3 Additionally, Gonzales was specifically named as a protected person, which deflated the majority position that
any benefit from the PO was incidental.'84
Finally, Justice Stevens criticized the implication that an interest in
PO enforcement is less valid than other government services, such as welfare
benefits.'85 Justice Stevens explained that the novelty of domestic violence
mandatory arrest statutes makes a property interest in enforcement equally
novel. 6 He concluded that just because
a property interest is new does not
87
make it any less a property interest.
At the end of his dissent, Justice Stevens addressed the question of
what process would be constitutionally required. Given that the majority
opinion decided that Gonzales had no protected property interest in enforcement and thus never reached what kind of enforcement would be due,
he only briefly covered how to evaluate that question.'
Justice Stevens's
criteria included that "a relevant state decisionmaker listen to the claimant
and then apply the relevant criteriain reaching his decision."'8 9

182.

Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2816, 2821 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

183. Id. at 2821 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is little doubt that the statute at
issue in this case conferred a benefit 'on a specific class of people' - namely, recipients of domestic restraining orders.").
184. Id. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

185.
186.

Id. at 2822-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

187. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 2824-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2824 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cited Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 81 (1979) (stressing the requirements of notice and opportunity to be
heard); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971) (requiring hearings to be meaningful and appropriate to the nature of the case to satisfy due process); and Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (stressing decisionmaker impartiality and that the
decision rest on legal rules and evidence from the hearing) for this proposition. Id.
at 2825 n.22. The implication seems to be that officers must consider the report of a

protection order violation and apply the relevant criteria, probable cause in this case,
to determine the appropriate action. Colorado's § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) states that:
A peace officer shall arrest, or ...seek a warrant for the arrest of a
restrained person when the peace officer has information amounting to probable cause that: (I) The restrained person has violated
or attempted to violate any provision of a protection order; and (II)
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Archive
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ANALYSIS

The United States Supreme Court incorrectly concluded that the
Colorado domestic violence mandatory enforcement statutes were not sufficient to create a property interest in their enforcement. ' To do this, the
Court discounted a history of domestic violence mandatory enforcement
statutes across the country, improperly dismissed the context of and policy
reasons behind the domestic violence statute, and applied a de facto requirement of monetary value. 9 ' The Castle Rock ruling could have several
effects. The decision reduces the clarity of procedural due process law and
may discourage POs as a solution to violence in the minds of victims, perhaps making violence towards abusers a more attractive method of escape. 92
There are several ways that states and domestic violence specialists may deal
with the Castle Rock decision. The states may be able to strengthen their
mandatory arrest statutes or choose to pursue the same policy ends through
different means. 9 ' Despite the Court's ruling in Castle Rock, domestic violence specialists will probably continue as before, focusing on working directly with local law enforcement agencies194to encourage protection order
enforcement and mandatory arrest practices.
The majority in Castle Rock failed to consider the important policy
goals and the means chosen by Colorado and other states to achieve those
goals. There are unique circumstances surrounding domestic violence legislation and mandatory arrest, as articulated in the dissent. 95 Justice Stevens
properly criticized the majority's dismissal of the unique context of these
protection order or the restrained person has received actual notice
of the existence and substance of such order.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (emphasis added).
190. In order to fully understand the issues involved in domestic violence, it is
helpful to have a solid understanding of the dynamics, cultural issues, and various
public means of addressing this problem. Such a topic is beyond the scope of this
note. See generally Melanie Randall, Domestic Violence and the Construction of
"Ideal Victims": Assaulted Women's "Image Problems" in Law, 23 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REv. 107, 107-15 (2004) (outlining domestic violence dynamics in general);
White, supra note 29, at 711-19 (discussing broad domestic violence principles).
191. See Hocter, supra note 30 (discussing the history of mandatory arrest policies); Dayton, supra note 30 (exploring mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution
policies); Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (mandatory statutory
language insufficient to create an obligation to arrest).
192. See infra text accompanying notes 233-34.
193. See Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 2806 (2005) (implying that a
"stronger indication" may sufficiently show that mandatory enforcement is the true
intent of the legislature); Tebo, infra note 202 (stating administrative remedies as
possible alternatives to promote protection order enforcement).
194. Tebo, infra note 202.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/15
195. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
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mandatory arrest laws.'" The majority quickly discounted the history, stating that "much of the impetus for mandatory arrest statutes and policies derived from the idea that it is better for police officers to arrest the aggressor
in a domestic-violence incident than to attempt to mediate the dispute or
merely to ask the offender to leave the scene."' 97 This reasoning was clearly
based on the Minnesota Experiment, as these were the three experimental
conditions used in that study. 98
The Court also refers to the American Bar Association's (ABA)
1980 Standards for Criminal Justice." The standards generally state that
statutes that seemed to require enforcement for some crimes could not be
0 4 The standards'
taken literally."
applicability in this context is questionable
because they were issued just as the domestic violence context began to distinguish itself from criminal justice as a whole. 20 1 A co-chair of the ABA
Criminal Justice Section's Amicus Curiae Briefs Committee, Rory K. Little,
said that "the [C]ourt's reliance on a single paragraph of commentary written
more than 252 years ago may not accurately reflect the current day views of
20
the ABA.
Additionally, the majority interpreted the mandatory arrest statute's
focus as personal, emphasizing arrest when an abuser is present.2 3 In the
following paragraph, however, the majority characterized the statute as general and stated that even if there were an entitlement, it would not be specific
enough to Gonzales to constitute a property interest.20 4 The Court asserted
both that the focus is personal protection, when an abuser is present, and that

196. Id. (Stephens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is clear that the elimination of police discretion was integral to Colorado and its fellow States' solution to the problem of
underenforcement in domestic violence cases. Since the text of Colorado's statute
perfectly captures this legislative purpose, it is hard to imagine what the Court has in
mind when it insists on 'some stronger indication from the Colorado Legislature.'"
(footnote and citation omitted)).
197. Id. at 2806-07.
198. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
199. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE Standard 1-4.5 cmt. (1986)).

200.
201.

Id.
Hocter, supra note 30, at 653 (explaining the growth of mandatory arrest

laws since 1977); Dayton, supra note 30, at 283 (following state mandatory arrest
laws from 1977 to 1991).
202. Margaret Graham Tebo, Protective Orders' Power in State's Hands, ABA J.
E-REPORT July 1, 2005, WL 4 NO. 26 ABAJEREP 1.
203. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806-07. The majority claims that the point of the
arrest laws was to prompt action only "when the offender is present at the scene."

Id. at 2807.

Published
204.by Law
Id. atArchive
2808. of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006

23

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 6 [2006], No. 2, Art. 15

Vol. 6

the focus is too general to apply to Jessica Gonzales specifically enough to
create a protected interest.20

5

The Colorado Legislature seems to acknowledge the difficult role of
police in situations where the suspect may not be present by providing op2
tions in addition to arrest in protection order violations. ' Without this
guidance, officers would probably be bound to arrest per the general domestic violence law found in sections 18-6-800.3 and 18-6-803.6.2o7 Violation
of a PO is already a crime according to Colorado law.20 ' Furthermore, offenders' violative actions will probably be used to coerce, control, punish,
intimidate, or get revenge on the protected party.0 9 The protection order
statute offers two options for enforcement. The police may either arrest a
violator or seek an arrest warrant. 210 According to the statute, the only case
in which an officer may do nothing is if there is no probable cause to believe
that a protection order was violated."' Probable cause is a "wholly objective" measurement, indicating far less discretion than the Court acknowledged. 2
The Court also failed to address the other compelling reasons states
enact mandatory arrest statutes, such as changing societal norms and general
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 2806-08.
1994 Act, supra note 45.
Id., supra notes 47, 49.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(1) (West 2005).

209.

Id. § 18-6-800.3(1). In this case, it may be arguable whether the abduction of

the daughters was used for the referenced purposes, although it is likely considering
the known abuser strategy of using children against the victir. See Prentice L.
White, You May Never See Your Child Again: Adjusting the Batterer's Visitation
Rights to Protect Children From Future Abuse, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &
L. 327 (2005) (illustrating ways batterers manipulate the child custody system and
suggesting reforms to address them); Brett Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 127, 173 n.109 (1998) (noting
"using children" as one of several abuser tactics); Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That For Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 28 (2004) (noting ways
abusers use the legal system); Susan G. Bendar, Substance and Woman Abuse - A
Proposal for Integrated Treatment, 67 FED. PROBATION 52, 52 (2003) (including
"using children" in list of abuser tactics).
210. 1994 Act, supra note 45.
211. Id.
212. U.S. v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 456 (6th Cir. 1991) ("The test for the existence of probable cause is wholly objective. Probable cause exists when a 'man of
reasonable caution[]' would be warranted in the belief that the person arrested had
or will commit a crime.") (citing Dunaway v. New York 442 U.S. 200, 208 n.9
(1979)). See also Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967) (referring to probable
cause as "a neutral predetermination"); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (referhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/15
ring to "an objective predetermination of probable cause").
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deterrence, both of which are important policy reasons for these statutes.2" 3
States, including Colorado, have legislated removal of police discretion as
the best solution for the problem of domestic violence." 4 There may be
some debate about the merits of such policies, but it is not the place of the
federal judiciary to second-guess those policy choices." 5 In the words of
Justice Blackmun, "the States cannot serve as laboratories for social and
economic experiment ...

if they must pay an added price when they meet

the changing needs of their citizenry by taking'2up
functions that an earlier
t6
day and a different society left in private hands."
Ignoring these principles, the Court's reasoning suggests the statute
requires a more specific entitlement, which is a departure from its holdings
in other procedural due process cases.1 7 In these cases, the individual states
created benefits for classes of people, such as welfare recipients or employees, and then acted to include individuals in those classes by hiring those
individuals or actually giving the benefits.2 8 In this respect, there is nothing
to distinguish those cases from Castle Rock. The state created a statute
mandating enforcement of protection orders and then actively included Jessica Gonzales and her children as statutorily "protected person[s]. ' ' 219

in

fact, the statute in effect at the time of the events giving rise to this case defined a protected person as one "forwhose benefit the [protection] order was
issued. 22 °
Castle Rock muddies the waters somewhat in the law surrounding
procedural due process, though the case's applicability is probably limited to

213. See supra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
214. Id.
215. Hoctor, supra note 30, at 657-60 (describing the inconclusiveness of studies
measuring the efficacy of mandatory arrest statutes); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305, 328 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[Georgia statute requiring drug tests
for senatorial candidates] is the sort of policy judgment that surely must be left to
legislatures, rather than being announced from on high by the Federal Judiciary.")
See also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 386 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he
Framers never imagined that federal judges would displace state executive officials
and state legislatures in charting state policy.").
216. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546, 567 n.13
(1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted) ("The genius of our
government provides that, within the sphere of constitutional action, the people acting not through the courts but through their elected legislative representatives have the power to determine as conditions demand, what services and functions the
public welfare requires." (quoting Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427 (Black,
J., concurring))).
217. See supra notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
218. Id.
219. See Castle Rock, 125 U.S. at 2800-01.
220.by Law
COLO.
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similar factual situations.2 ' The situations in which this case would apply
would, for now, be limited to those areas in which the states have traditionally held so much discretion that the benefit is tenuous in most situations.
Castle Rock also gave the monetary value of state entitlements considerably
more weight than prior cases.
Justice Scalia cited a law review article
written by Professor Thomas W. Merrill of Northwestern University.23 Professor Merrill stated that "it also seems implicit... that [property] interests
have some ascertainable monetary value. 224 Professor Merrill based this
conclusion in part on an inductive evaluation of the case law, concluding
that the recognized interests "nearly all have a monetary value., 225 He also

reasoned that such a distinction is necessary to distinguish property rights
from liberty rights. 226 Finally, he concluded that such a requirement "preserves a degree of continuity between the constitutional definition and the
ordinary understanding of property., 227 The Court did not explore any of
Professor Merrill's reasons for holding a monetary value necessary.228 The
decision cursorily noted the lack of any monetary value and cited Professor
Merrill's article for the proposition that it is required.229
Apart from departures from existing case law, this decision could affect victims' reliance on protection orders as a solution to abuse. State legislatures, including Colorado's, provided a mechanism designed to deter
abuse.23 ° It is logical to conclude that allowing discretion in an area where
policymakers identified a problem would tend to encourage the original
status quo. 3 Indeed, the Tenth Circuit seems to have come to that conclusion when it wrote that a decision that the police were not liable "would render domestic abuse restraining orders utterly valueless. 232

221. Castle Rock, 125 U.S. at 2810. Section 1983 does "not create a system by
which police departments are generally held financially accountable for crimes that
better policing might have prevented.. . ." Id. at 2810.

222.
223.

Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2809.
Id.

224.

Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of ConstitutionalProperty, 86 VA. L.

REv. 885,964 (2000).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 965.
228. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2809.
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
232. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1109 (10th Cir. 2004). The
Court responded to the Tenth Circuit by stating: "[tlhe creation of grounds on which
[Mr. Gonzales] could be arrested, criminally prosecuted, and held in contempt was
hardly 'valueless'-even if the prospect of those sanctions ultimately failed to prehttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/15
vent him from committing three murders and a suicide." Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at

26

2006
CASE NOTE
Williams: Constitutional Law - When States Break Promises: Defining Propert

Another possible effect of Castle Rock is increased risk for abusers.
One important though rarely discussed purpose of criminal law is to promote
the rule of law by deterring vigilante justice and "self-help. 233 Offenders in
domestic violence face a possible danger from their victims, albeit as an
effect of their own abusive actions. Victims who eventually kill their abuser
usually have attempted various strategies to end the abuse and their efforts to
protect themselves have failed."" The perception that a PO will not be enforced will make protection orders a less attractive solution to victims.235 If
the apparent viability of a legal option is drastically reduced, the remaining
solutions - even the illegal ones - may become more attractive.
Overcoming CastleRock
States passing mandatory arrest laws are making conscious choices
to raise the status of domestic violence crimes and eliminate the traditional
discretion of police officers.236 This case threatens those purposes. Nevertheless, the Court seemed to imply that it was possible for a state to overcome the burden the Court set by using language giving a "stronger indication" that mandatory enforcement is the true intent of the legislature.237 Unfortunately, the Court did not explore precisely how emphatic such language
must be.
Alternatively, legislatures may require some kind of administrative
discipline for officers who fail to enforce mandatory arrest statutes. 238 This
may encourage enforcement of POs, though it does not address the issue of a
protected property interest. The Court also pointed out that state legislatures
2805. Victims seeking solutions may or may not share that characterization. Tebo,
supra note 202.

233. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)("'When people begin to
believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of anarchy of
self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law."') (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
234. White, supra note 29, at 731. White states:
[M]ost victims have attempted to end the terror of violence by either leaving the relationship, petitioning the courts for protective
orders, calling the police, or seeking refuge in shelters. The
women who do resort to using lethal violence against their partners are the ones who are faced with an ongoing attack or the imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.
Id.
235.
236.

Tebo, supra note 202.
See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
237. Castle Rock, 125 S.Ct. at 2806.
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may elect to explicitly create a cause of action under state law.239 In any
case, accountability will continue to be a primary concern of state legislatures.
Domestic violence advocates are accustomed to working with law
enforcement agencies on a local level to promote effective protection order
enforcement."24 Castle Rock will probably not change that aspect of advocacy a great deal.24' The message that such a ruling sends to victims, however, could be another matter. 242
CONCLUSION

In order to find a protected property interest in a government service, a person must have a legitimate entitlement to a benefit. The benefit
does not have to be one a government is obliged to provide, but it must be
mandatory once given. In Castle Rock, the Court added an additional requirement that the benefit in question may not be one with traditionally wide
governmental discretion, at least not without stronger language than was in
the Colorado statute at issue. This is true even in the face of legislative efforts to limit that discretion over the last thirty years. The Court also indicated that a property interest must have some monetary value, though it did
not elaborate on this requirement. The Court effectively undermined the
means the Colorado Legislature chose to address a pressing societal problem. It neglected to account for the unique history of mandatory arrest in the
domestic violence context and reduced the accountability of law enforcement. However, state legislatures are not without further strategies to implement mandatory arrest practices in their states. While the effect of Castle
Rock on victims is still unknown, there could potentially be a negative impact on the perceived viability of protection orders.
MACKENZIE WILLIAMS

239.

Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2810.

240.

Tebo, supra note 202.

241. Id.
242. Id. ("'Mandatory arrest statutes don't mean what they say
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